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THEY BEG FOR OUR PROTECTION AND WE
REFUSE: U.S. ASYLUM LAW'S FAILURE TO
PROTECT MANY OF TODAY'S REFUGEES
Laura Isabel Bauer*
INTRODucrION
Alvaro Moralez fled for his life when he left his native Colombia.
After participating in a peaceful protest at the Colombian Consulate
in August of 2001, Moralez feared retaliation by paramilitary groups
and sought protection for himself, his wife, and his child.' He found
safety in Australia, but the Refugee Review Tribunal rejected his asy-
lum petition.2 Desperate and unable to return home, Moralez left his
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2004; B.A., Rhodes
College, 2001. I would like to thank Professor Mike LaRosa for his guidance in my
undergraduate studies, his patience with a "future lawyer," and his suggestions
regarding this Note topic. I would also like to thank Professor Barbara Szweda and
Rebecca Houghton for their invaluable guidance at the Notre Dame Immigration
Clinic, where I have had the opportunity to work with asylum-seekers first hand and
argue their cases before the Chicago Immigration Court. My deepest appreciation
goes to Jeremy Gayed, Justin Lemaire, Chad McTighe, and especially Gregory Ripple
for their comments and criticism-as well as to the entire staff of the Notre Dame Law
Review for all of their hard work throughout the publication process. Finally, I would
like to thank my parents, Bruce and Carol, for their encouragement and support.
1 COALITION FOR THE PROTECTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS, DEPORTATION CASE STUD-
IES, at http://www.refugeeaction.org/deportation/deportationstudies.htm (last
modified May 26, 2003) [hereinafter DEPORTATION CASE STUDIES].
2 Cynthia Banham, This Man Asked for Our Help-Now He's Dead, SYDNEY MORN-
ING HERALD, Oct. 9, 2002, at 1, available at 2002 WL 101206256; Linda McSweeny &
Sharon Mathieson, Federal Government Denies Responsibility for Fate of Colombian, AUSTL.
ASSOCIATED PRESS GEN. NEWS, Oct. 9, 2002, available at 2002 WL 100319629; Rejected
Refugee Killed After Deportation, Says Australian Opposition, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Oct. 9,
2002, available at 2002 WL 23620487 [hereinafter Killed After Deportation].
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wife and baby in Australia and applied for asylum in Argentina, but
there too he was denied.3 Argentina deported Moralez and forced
him to return to Colombia. 4 Following his arrival, Moralez was shot
dead by paramilitaries near his parents' home.5 The assassins riddled
his chest with bullets.6 When reports of Moralez's death made news-
paper headlines, Australia quickly denied culpability. 7 Australian At-
torney-General Daryl Williams defended the government's actions,
saying: "He went (to Argentina) voluntarily and what occurred after
that was really his own responsibility." 8 Williams failed to acknowl-
edge, however, that the Australian government gave Moralez only one
other choice: deportation to Colombia.9
Today, a four-decade-long conflict in Colombia continues to in-
crease in intensity and devastation. 10 Yet, every year the United States
refuses to grant thousands of applications from Colombians seeking
asylum within our borders and forces refugees to return to the dan-
gers from which they fled-back to situations in which they may very
well lose their lives. Alvaro Moralez never made it to the United States
to ask for asylum. If he had, it is unlikely that the law would have
done anything to protect him.11 In 2002, 7967 of Moralez's fellow
citizens placed themselves upon the mercy of the U.S. federal govern-
ment.12 Only thirty-seven percent of those asylum petitions were ap-
proved.13 Moralez's story is unique only because it was documented.
We remain blissfully ignorant of how many individuals-returned to
Colombia after being denied asylum in the United States-suffer a
fate similar to that of Alvaro Moralez. This treatment of Colombian
3 DEPORTATION CASE STUDIES, supra note 1.
4 Id.
5 Banham, supra note 2; McSweeny & Mathieson, supra note 2; Killed After Depor-
tation, supra note 2.
6 DEPORTATION CASE STUDIES, supra note 1.
7 McSweeny & Mathieson, supra note 2.
8 Meaghan Shaw, Australia Denies Blame for Asylum Seeker's Death, AGE, Oct. 10,
2002, at http://www.theage.com.au/arficles/2002/10/09/1034061256063.html.
9 DEPORTATION CASE STUDIES, supra note 1.
10 See infra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
11 Like the United States, see infra note 29 and accompanying text, Australia
adopted the 1951 U.N. Convention definition for "refugee," and Australia's officials
concluded that Moralez failed to meet that definition. Shaw, supra note 8. For the
many reasons set forth in this Note, U.S. officials likely would have done the same.
12 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2002
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTIcS 71 (2003), available at http://uscis.gov/graph-
ics/shared/aboutus/statistics/Yearbook2002.pdf [hereinafter 2002 YEARBOOK].
13 Id.
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refugees, however, is only one example of a greater failure in U.S.
asylum law.
Part I of this Note examines the public policy and history behind
U.S. asylum law, oudines the standards by which today's asylum appli-
cants are judged, and discusses the ramifications for modern refugees
of the discretionary procedure currently in place. Part II presents a
case study of the issues faced by today's asylum-seekers by focusing on
the Colombian conflict. A brief overview of the parties and motives
involved in the civil war is followed by an examination of currently
declining rates of asylum approvals for an increasing number of Co-
lombian refugees in the United States. Part II concludes with a look
at how U.S. law has been applied in court cases involving Colombian
asylum-seekers and addresses other factors that likely affect the deci-
sions of immigration officers and judges. The primary complications
for Colombians and other sincere refugees fleeing similar violence in
their homelands are the narrow and unrealistic demands of an asylum
law that refuses to acknowledge many current conflicts as political and
does not recognize the realities of persecution in today's world. Part
III suggests that while Temporary Protected Status is a welcome solu-
tion for those already present on U.S. soil, adopting a completely new
definition of "refugee" is a bold step forward that can both update our
law to take into account changing world conditions and reinforce this
nation's conviction that all people have the right to live life free from
oppression and fear. In the words of President George W. Bush,
"American values and American interests lead in the same direction:
We stand for human liberty." 14 Yet, U.S. asylum law does not suffi-
ciently protect many refugees who flee persecution as a result of politi-
cal violence and seek liberty and shelter in the United States.
I. U.S. AsYLuM LAw: A SERIES OF INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS
FOR TODAY'S REFUGEE
Asylum or refugee status is often the only means of legal entry
into this country for immigrants without familial ties or offers of em-
ployment in the United States. For those fleeing killings, torture, de-
struction of their towns or villages, and upheaval in their native lands,
asylum status is a matter of life and death. The United States, how-
ever, is selective in whom it will shelter. Admission is not easy. Policy-
makers justify harsh entry requirements by pointing to the "broad
rights granted to asylees, and [the] concern that many people who
14 Address to the Nation on Iraq from the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, 39 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. Doc. 516, 517 (May 5, 2003).
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apply for asylum do not actually qualify for it.''15 As a result, Congress
has been careful to control "which individuals can find refuge in the
United States, by regulating, restricting or enhancing the access of
such individuals to the protection of U.S. laws." 16 Currently, asylum
applicants confront an exacting standard of proof and a discretionary
system established to fulfill political goals. All of these factors com-
bine to function as a series of institutional barriers that make it ex-
tremely difficult for those who flee today's world conflicts to prevail
on their asylum claims.
A. Foundations and Motivations: Political Origins and Practice
Domestic refugee and asylum law in the United States was estab-
lished to address political concerns and has been utilized since its in-
ception as an instrument of national self-interest. Prior to 1948, the
United States did not have a refugee or asylum policy. 17 Aside from
discriminatory laws limiting immigration from Asia, few restrictions
governed the entry of foreign nationals.' 8 Asylum came to be viewed
as a political institution that would be unnecessary in the modern
world. This manner of thinking was exemplified in a 1932 Presiden-
tial campaign speech by Herbert Hoover. "With the growth of democ-
racy in foreign countries," Hoover stated, "political persecution has
largely ceased. There is no longer a necessity for the United States to
provide an asylum for those persecuted because of conscience." 19
This assertion was rejected, however, after the atrocities of the
Second World War came to light. In 1948, Congress passed the Dis-
placed Persons Act2 0 and provided for "eligible Displaced Persons" to
enter the United States. 21 The Act was a political move that granted
shelter solely to those fleeing their countries for political reasons;
"Displaced Persons" included only those refugees oppressed by the
new Communist governments in Czechoslovakia, and Austrians,
Germans, and Italians forced to leave their homes by Nazi or Fascist
15 3 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 33.05(1] (rev.
ed. 2003).
16 KAREN MUSALO ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY:. A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNA-
TIONAL APPROACH 4 (2d ed. 2002).
17 CENTER FOR CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ADMISSION OF REFUGEES AND ASYLEES
UNDER THE LAW (1980), reprinted in MUSALO ET AL., supra note 16, at 63.
18 Id.
19 9 INTERPRETER RELEASES 260, 261 (1932), quoted in STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMI-
GRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 854 (3d ed. 2002).
20 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009.
21 Id. at 1010.
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regimes.22 Although some members of Congress argued that the Act
was necessary for "moral and compassionate reasons,"23 many more in
Congress viewed the Act as a political tool-a "form of psychological
warfare" in the emerging conflict between the United States and the
Soviet Union.24 Legislators hoped that encouraging refugees to leave
Communist areas and defect to the United States would undermine
Soviet leaders. 25 Other members of Congress pointed out that allevi-
ating the strain on western European nations caused by millions of
uprooted peoples "would make those countries stronger bulwarks
against Communism."
26
In the end, political rhetoric trumped humanitarian ideals in
both the enactment and subsequent implementation of the new refu-
gee law. The Act aided those who fled Communist-dominated re-
gions, but failed to protect many of the Jewish victims of Nazi
persecution. 27 In 1957, Congress maintained the political emphasis of
refugee law and continued to define "refugees" by geographic and
political terms-limiting admission to individuals fleeing "Commu-
nist, Communist-dominated, or Communist occupied area[s]" and
Middle Eastern nations.
28
It was not until 1968 that the United States indicated that it might
deviate from a politically oriented refugee and asylum law. In that
year, Congress ratified the United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees of 1967.29 The Protocol included the nationality-
neutral definition of "refugee" adopted by the United Nations 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 30 and prohibited state
22 Id. at 1009-10.
23 LEGOMSKY, supra note 19, at 857.
24 Kathryn M. Bockley, Comment, A Historical Overview of Refugee Legislation: The
Deception of Foreign Policy in the Land of Promise, 21 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 253, 262
(1995).
25 Id.
26 LEGOMSKY, supra note 19, at 857.
27 Bockley, supra note 24, at 262.
28 Act of September 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, § 15(c)(1) (a), 71 Stat. 639, 643.
29 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6224, 606
U.N.T.S. 267.
30 Id. art. I, 2, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268. Article 1 of the 1951
Convention defined a refugee as an individual who:
[O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, relig-
ion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opin-
ion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who,
not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such a fear, is
unwilling to return to it.
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signatories from "expelling or returning a refugee to a country where
his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of...
protected characteristic [s] "3 '-regardless of country of origin or the
identity of the persecutor.
Yet, despite its written commitment to the Protocol, the United
States did not make any significant changes in the administration of
its refugee and asylum laws. In 1979, Senator Edward Kennedy asked
the Library of Congress to evaluate U.S. asylum and refugee admission
procedures for compliance with the Protocol. 32 The subsequent re-
port revealed that asylum policy had not abandoned its political orien-
tation and bias. The review stated that contrary to the politically
neutral standard it agreed to follow in the 1967 Protocol, the United
States continued to limit entry "ideologically, to aliens who have fled
from communism, or geographically, to aliens who have fled from the
Middle East."33 The report recommended that Congress, in order to
comply with its international obligation under the Protocol, "incorpo-
rate the United Nations definition of 'refugee.' "3 4
Congress followed this suggestion and passed the Refugee Act of
1980, which adopted a definition of "refugee" similar to that of the
United Nations and formally eliminated the idea that a refugee must
flee a particular kind of government. Asylum thus became officially
available to all individuals who feared returning to their home coun-
tries because of past persecution and/or a well-founded fear of future
persecution on account of race, nationality, political opinion, religion,
or social group.35 The Refugee Act was lauded by some policymakers
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. 6259,
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 152.
31 U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., History of the United States Asylum Officer
Corps, at http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/history.htm (last modified Sept.
9, 2003).
32 MUSALO ET AL., supra note 16, at 65.
33 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 96TH CONG., REVIEW OF U.S. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT
PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 15 (Comm. Print 1979) (outlining research prepared at the
request of Sen. Kennedy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary).
34 Id.
35 Susan Bibler Coutin, The Oppressed, the Suspect, and the Citizen: Subjectivity in Com-
peting Accounts of Political Violence, 26 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 63, 65 (2001). The Refugee
Act of 1980 reads:
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of
such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is
outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself
or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion, or (B) in such spe-
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as "one of the most important pieces of humanitarian legislation ever
enacted by a United States Congress," 3 6 and it appeared once again
that the United States was willing to abandon its political bias through
a "politically and geographically neutral adjudication standard.
3 7
Unfortunately, political motives persist in the administration of
U.S. asylum and refugee law.38 Because even a nationality-neutral def-
inition of "refugee" requires a conclusion that another government
has actively persecuted or failed to prevent persecution, an asylum
grant involves criticism of a nation's actions or inactions. Since 1980,
the U.S. government has catered to the plea of the refugee who "ad-
vance [s] American political objectives. '3 9 After Communist countries,
significant refugee admissions typically include "foreign policy
adversar[ies] ."40
The world today, however, is different than it was in 1980 when
Congress adopted its definition for "refugee." The Cold War is over,
and political "stalemates" between great superpowers are no longer
cial circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation (as
defined in section 1157(e) of this title) may specify, any person who is within
the country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no
nationality, within the country in which such person is habitually residing,
and who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. The term "refugee" does not include any person
who ordered, indicted, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution
of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000).
36 126 CONG. REc. 1523 (1980).
37 U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., supra note 31.
38 One of the most notable examples of the influence of political foreign policy
on the determination of asylum claims involved Guatemalan and Salvadoran appli-
cants in the 1980s. U.S. policy favored and supported the national governments of
both Guatemala and El Salvador, and as a result, most asylum applicants from those
countries were denied. See Robert M. Cannon, Comment, A Reevaluation of the Rela-
tionship of the Administrative Procedure Act to Asylum Hearings: The Ramifications of the
American Baptist Church's Settlement, 5 ADMIN. L.J. 713, 727 n.68 (1991). In American
Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991), the U.S. government
conceded that "foreign policy and border enforcement considerations are not rele-
vant to the determination of whether an applicant for asylum has a well-founded fear
of persecution," id. at 799, and granted Salvadorans and Guatemalans de novo review
of their asylum cases. Id.
39 Bockley, supra note 24, at 256.
40 Tahl Tyson, Comment, The Refugee Act of 1980: Suggested Reforms in the Overseas
Refugee Program to Safeguard Humanitarian Concerns from Competing Interests, 65 WASH. L.
Rv. 921, 928 (1990).
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the norm.41 Now, "identity-based conflicts built around religion,
ethnicity, nationality, race, clan, language or region" abound.42 These
conflicts often take place within a country's borders instead of on an
international scale, and warring factions target civilians instead of
each other.43 Today's archetypal oppressor for modern refugees is
n6t the Communist or Fascist superpower whose political goals are
established, easily articulated, and clearly contrary to U.S. policy. Per-
haps he is not even a member of a nation's government. Instead, he is
a neighbor who belongs to a different tribe, a masked guerilla soldier,
or a stranger's threatening voice on the phone-and his political
goals may be unclear or easily misunderstood as mere greed or
prejudice.
The political foundations and motivations underlying U.S. asylum
law place today's asylum-seekers in a difficult situation. If refugees are
more likely to prevail when their admission advances U.S. political
objectives, today's asylum-seeker must try to convince the U.S. govern-
ment that it should care that rebel forces have threatened her family,
a neighbor wants her dead, or that the identity of a caller is not as
important as the fear it inspires. For the asylum-seeker who flees a
government the United States supports or a conflict in which the
United States does not want to get involved, this can be a near impos-
sible task.
B. Exacting Standards: "Well-Founded Fear" and
"Particularized Persecution"
The law's demand that an asylum-seeker fulfill strict standards of
proof also makes establishing a valid claim of asylum extremely aiffi-
cult for today's refugee. Under section 101 (a) (42) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (INA), an asylum applicant must prove that
she (1) suffered persecution in the past, or (2) has a "well-founded
fear" of future persecution "on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."44
Proof of past persecution creates a presumption of a well-founded fear
of future persecution, 45 but that presumption may be rebutted by
41 See OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE
WORLD'S REFUGEES: FIFTY YEARS OF HuMANITARIAN AcrION 275 (2000), available at




44 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000).
45 See Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) § 101(a) (42) (A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a)(42)(A); Ratnam v. INS, 154 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 1998); Fergiste v. INS,
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proof that fundamental changes in country conditions have eroded
the basis for future fear.
46
The definition of "well-founded fear," has never been definitively
established. In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,47 the U.S. Supreme Court rea-
soned that "[t]here is obviously some ambiguity in a term like 'well-
founded fear' which can only be given concrete meaning through a
process of case-by-case adjudication." 48 The only real guidance the
Court provided was its conclusion that the standard of "well-founded
fear" must have a "focus on the individual's subjective beliefs. ' 49 After
Cardoza-Fonseca, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) proposed
guidelines it believed were consistent with the Supreme Court's hold-
ing.50 First, an asylum applicant must show that a "reasonable person
in [the applicant's] circumstances would fear persecution." 51 Then, a
court should consider objective evidence, such as whether "the coun-
try at issue . . .has a history of persecuting people in circumstances
similar to the asylum applicant's." 5
2
Subsequent federal court decisions have established that, at the
very least, the "well-founded fear" standard includes both a subjective
and objective component: an applicant must prove that her fear is (1)
subjectively genuine, and (2) objectively well-founded. 53 The objec-
tive component of the test "requires a showing 'by credible, direct,
and specific evidence in the record, that persecution is a reasonable
possibility.' "
54
138 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1998); In reC-Y-Z, 211. & N. Dec. 915 (1997); In reH-, 21 1. &
N. Dec. 337 (1996).
46 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (1) (i) (A) (2003).
47 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
48 Id. at 448.
49 Id. at 431.
50 In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (1987).
51 Id. at 445.
52 Id. at 446.
53 See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 1996); Castillo v. INS, 951 F.2d
1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991); Cuadras v. INS, 910 F.2d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 1990); Diaz-
Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1986); OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH
COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING
REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO
THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 38 (1992), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
instree/refugeehandbook.pdf. [hereinafter HANDBOOK ON THE 1951 CONVENTION
AND 1967 PROTOCOL].
54 Meza-Manay v. INS, 139 F.3d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Singh v. Ilchert,
63 F.3d 1501, 1506 (9th Cir. 1995)). This showing may be established through "the
production of specific documentary evidence or by the credible and persuasive testi-
mony of the applicant." Id.
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This objective requirement dooms many sincere asylum-seekers
to failure. When an individual flees past or prospective persecution,
she rarely has the time or resources to collect and carry evidence vali-
dating that persecution or fear.55 Sometimes that evidence may not
even exist or be available-especially when an oppressor acts in a cov-
ert manner.56 How does a refugee.prove that a guerilla came to his
home and made verbal threats on his life? How does an asylum-seeker
prove that he was imprisoned for months by a police force that does
not advertise its wrongdoings? Persecutors rarely write down the
atrocities they commit and give reasons for their actions. In the words
of one rejected and exasperated asylum applicant, "What documen-
tary proof is there of rape and murder?" 57 Because an asylum-seeker
faces these kinds of complications, the Office of the U.N. High Com-
missioner for Refugees urges giving asylum applicants the "benefit of
the doubt."5 8 Yet, in our politicized and discretionary asylum system,
the "benefit of the doubt," may be conveniently disregarded. Today,
when concerns regarding terrorism and national security after Sep-
tember 11, 2001, have led to "tightened immigration and asylum poli-
cies" in the United States,59 many asylum applicants will never see an
officer or judge who will give them the "benefit of the doubt"-and as
a result, many genuine asylum-seekers will be rejected.
A 1992 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in INS v. Elias-
Zacarias60 added an additional, and often impossible, hurdle for mod-
ern refugees who now seek asylum in the United States. Elias-
Zacarias, a native of Guatemala, claimed he fulfilled the requirements
for asylum because armed guerillas threatened him at his home. 61
55 SeeAbankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18, 26 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasizing that"a genu-
ine refugee does not flee her native country armed with affidavits, expert witnesses,
and extensive documentation"); see also HANDBOOK ON THE 1951 CONVENTION AND
1967 PROTOCOL, supra note 53, 196 (stating that "a person fleeing from persecution
will have arrived with the barest necessities and very frequently even without personal
documents").
56 See Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Persecu-
tors are hardly likely to provide their victims with affidavits attesting to their acts of
persecution.").
57 Sonia Verma, Desperate for Refuge as Border Closes, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 7, 2002,
at Al, available at 2002 WL 103588813 (describing the situation of an asylum appli-
cant in Canada-yet, the applicant's frustration is one shared by many asylum-seekers
in the United States).
58 See HANDBOOK ON THE 1951 CONVENTION AND 1967 PROTOCOL, supra note 53,
203.
59 Arthur C. Helton & Dessie P. Zagorcheva, Globalization, Terror, and the Move-
ments of People, 36 INT'L LAW. 91, 94 (2002).
60 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
61 Id. at 479.
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The guerillas ordered Elias-Zacarias and his parents to join their or-
ganization, and when he and his parents refused, the rebels told them
"that they would be back, and that they should think it over about
joining them."62 Afraid of retaliation by the guerillas-and by the
government if it found out that he had communications with the
guerillas-Elias-Zacarias fled to the United States. He later proffered
evidence that the guerillas returned to his home twice after his depar-
ture in an effort to recruit his services.63 Resisting recruitment, he
asserted, was an expression of a political opinion for which he had a
well-founded fear of future persecution if he returned to Guatemala. 64
The Supreme Court disagreed with Elias-Zacarias. The Court
held that when an asylum applicant claims that he has been perse-
cuted because of a political opinion, the political opinion in question
is the "victim's political opinion, not the persecutor's," 65 and refusing
to join a guerilla organization is not proof of a political opinion.66
This conclusion alone dooms many genuine asylum applicants who
fled their countries due to fear of conscription by rebel forces. The
Court also emphasized, however, that the fact guerilla organizations
have political goals does not mean their forced recruitment practices
constitute "persecution on account of ... political opinion.. 67 "[T] he
mere existence of a generalized 'political' motive underlying the guer-
illas' forced recruitment," the Court held, "is inadequate to establish
... the proposition that Elias-Zacarias fears persecution on account of
[his] political opinion. ' 68 Even if Elias-Zacarias could establish that
he had a political opinion, the Court determined that he must also
prove that he had a well-founded fear "that the guerrillas will perse-
cute him because of that political opinion, rather than because of his
refusal to fight with them."69 It does not appear that the Court under-
stood that, for Elias-Zacarias and the guerillas who came to his home,
those two issues were one and the same.
As a result of the Supreme Court's holding in Elias-Zacarias,
under the current definition of "refugee," an asylum applicant must
not only show that he has a political opinion or belongs to a particular
race, religion, nationality, or social group, but he must also show that
it is because of that political opinion, race, religion, nationality, or so-
62 Id.
63 Id. at 480.
64 See id.




69 Id. at 483.
20041 1o91
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
cial group, that he suffers persecution. Asylum-seekers must establish
particularized persecution to fulfill the "on account of' language of the
current law. They must "prove that they were individually targeted
because of being somehow 'different' from the population at large,"
70
and they must show "how and why their actions [have] placed them at
risk. ' 71 When multiple political groups are at war in one's native
country, however, and political violence leads to widespread killing
and destruction, many genuine asylum applicants simply cannot prove
that they were individually targeted, let alone the reasons behind such
persecution.
7 2
C. The Power to Grant Asylum: A Discretionary System
The discretionary authority of immigration officers and judges
provides yet another hurdle for today's genuine asylum applicant.
Asylum-seekers 73 must file their applications within one year of their
arrival in the United States.74 An asylum-seeker who has not been ar-
70 Coutin, supra note 35, at 64.
71 Id. (emphasis added).
72 See id. at 65; see also Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 489 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("'It
does not matter to the persecutors what the individual's motivation is. The gueril-
las . .. do not inquire into the reasoning process of those who insist on remaining
neutral and refuse to join their cause."') (quoting Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767
F.2d 1277, 1287 (9th Cir. 1984)).
73 There is a distinction in domestic law between a refugee and an asylum-seeker.
"Refugee" is often used to refer to "overseas refugees" who must apply for status from
outside the United States. LEGOMSKY, supra note 19, at 851. Asylum-seekers, on the
other hand, must be physically present in the United States. INA § 208(a)(1), 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1) (2000) ("A[n] alien who is physically present in the United States
or who arrives in the United States... irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for
asylum . . . ."). Confusion often results, however, from the fact that the statutory
definition of "refugee" does not specify whether the noncitizen is overseas or in the
United States. See INA § 101 (a) (42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). In fact, to be eligible
for asylum, a noncitizen must first qualify as a "refugee" under section 101 (a) (42) of
the INA. INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). (For the definition of "refugee," see
supra note 35; the standards required for this qualification are discussed supra Part
I.B.) Thus, according to the letter of the law, every asylum-seeker is technically a
"refugee." LEGOMSKY, supra note 19, at 851. Applicants for asylum, however, are not
subject to statutory quotas; refugees, by contrast, are so restricted. INA § 207(a), 8
U.S.C. § 1157(a).
74 INA § 208(a) (2) (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2) (B); 8 C.F.R § 208.4(a) (2) (2003).
Only two exceptions to this rule exist: (1) changed country conditions that "materially
affect the applicant's eligibility for asylum," and (2) "extraordinary circumstances"
causing delay. INA § 208(a) (2) (D), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). The application may
be filed with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or with an immigration
judge (IJ). Gloria Goldman & Frank K. Lipiner, Asylum and Withholding of Removal, in
SELECTED FUNDAMENTALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 461, 472 (Stephanie L.
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rested by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or referred to
an immigration court files her "affirmative" application with DHS and
appears before an asylum officer to tell her story.75 If the asylum of-
ficer chooses not to grant asylum, the applicant is referred to an immi-
gration judge (IJ) for a full hearing.7 6 At all times, the burden of
proof rests solely with the applicant.
7 7
Yet, even if an asylum-seeker proves every aspect of her claim, an
asylum officer or immigration judge can deny her asylum as a matter
of discretion. 78 Because only one in five decisions by an asylum officer
are reversed in court, most asylum decisions are made at the level of
officer hearings. 79 No cameras or recording devices are allowed at
these hearings, and the entire process is "closed and confidential."8 0
This lack of documentation on the part of asylum officers easily hides
discriminatory motivations or arbitrary decisions from concerned in-
vestigators. The U.S. General Accounting Office found this to be true
when it examined differing approval rates for asylum applicants in
Browning ed., 2003). The correct forum depends largely on whether DHS has initi-
ated proceedings to remove the noncitizen from the country. Id.
75 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.2, 208.4.
76 See id. § 208.2. Immigration judges are a part of the Executive Office for Immi-
gration Review (EOIR), which falls under the Department of Justice. See id. § 3.0;
Executive Office of Immigration Review, 68 Fed. Reg. 9830 (Feb. 28, 2003) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003) (transferring 8 C.F.R. § 3.0 to 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003). If the
applicant has lawful status in the United States, however, the immigration court lacks
jurisdiction "unless and until that individual is deportable, excludable, or removable."
Goldman & Lipiner, supra note 74, at 472. Asylum applicants who have been arrested
by DHS or referred to an immigration court file their applications directly with an IJ.
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.2(b), 208.4(b)(3). Individuals who are detained at airports or
other ports of entry with fraudulent documents or no documents face "expedited
removal." Following an interview with a DHS inspector, the individual will be re-
moved from the United States immediately unless he or she "indicates either an inten-
tion to apply for asylum under § 208 or a fear of persecution." INA § 235 (b)(1)(A),
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1) (A). Those who indicate a desire for asylum are detained until
their interview with a DHS asylum officer. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(ii), (iv), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b) (1) (B) (ii), (iv). At this interview, the individual must convince the officer
that he or she has a "credible fear of persecution," or that person will be removed
from the United States. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii).
77 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a).
78 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(a)-(b); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 n.5
(1987); 3 GORDON ET AL., supra note 15, § 33.05[3] [b] [iii]. Asylum, as interpreted by
the courts, is not an "intrinsic right of a persecution victim." Coutin, supra note 35, at
72; see also United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 678-79 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming
the decision of the federal district court, which held that asylum is a discretionary
government action and not the right of a persecution victim).
79 WELL-FoUNDED FEAR (The Epidavros Project 2000).
80 Id..
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1987. Attributing decisions to bias, the agency reported, was next to
impossible because Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of-
ficers81 "generally did not document the reasons why applications
[we]re approved or denied."
2
Discretionary authority lays the foundation for a system that can
effortlessly refuse assistance to the most needy applicants. In the
words of one asylum officer, "If you're an [asylum] applicant, you play
asylum officer roulette here. Your chances of getting a grant depend
on who you get as much as what your claim is." s 3 Not only does to-
day's refugee have to prove particularized persecution that is consis-
tent with U.S. political objectives, she must also pray that a
sympathetic asylum officer hears and believes her story.
II. COLOMBIAN REFUGEES SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES:
A CASE STUDY
Asylum-seekers fleeing the current conflict in Colombia offer a
poignant example of the failures of our asylum system to provide suffi-
cient protection for the modern refugee. The nation of Colombia
emerged from the collapse of the larger "Gran Colombia" in 1830,84
and the country has been "marked by political and social violence"
since its formation.85 Today, Colombia is the oldest democracy in
Latin America,8 6 and the United States has invested billions of dollars
to ensure the current government's stability.
In 1998, the United States gave Colombia $43 million to support
counternarcotic operations, $14 million for helicopter upgrades, $21
million for aviation support, and $41 million in equipment and ser-
81 On March 1, 2003, the INS transitioned into the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., This is USCIS, at http://uscis.gov/graphics/
aboutus/thisisimm/index.htm (last modified Nov. 19, 2003). The procedural effects
of this change have been minimal. For instance, USCIS offices are located in former
INS locations, and official forms and documents issued by the INS are still valid and
accepted by the USCIS. Id.
82 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, UNIFORM APPLICATION OF STANDARDS UNCER-
TAIN 1 (1987).
83 WELL-FOUNDED FEAR, supra note 79.
84 U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Colombia, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK
(2003), available at http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/co.html.
Venezuela and Ecuador were also formed from the collapse. Id.
85 U.N. ESCOR, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 3, 1 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/16
(1998).
86 146 CONG. REC. H1053 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2000).
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vices.8 7 In 1999, the United States planned to give approximately
$203 million to the Colombian government, including an estimated
$96 million for six Black Hawk helicopters. s8 Such support made Co-
lombia the third largest recipient of U.S. assistance.8 9 On July 13,
2000, President Bill Clinton signed Public Law 106-246, 90 which in-
cluded $1.3 billion in aid to Colombia as part of a design called "Plan
Colombia." Almost eighty percent of the money was allocated for
counternarcotic efforts, and the funds financed military equipment-
including $400 million for more Black Hawk helicopters-and train-
ing for two counternarcotic battalions. 91 In 2002, President George
W. Bush signed Public Law 107-11592 to increase U.S. aid to Colombia.
The new package included a grant of $625 million, most of which
would "be spent on security assistance to the Colombian military."9 3
The U.S. government considers Colombia a nation of political
importance as the eighth largest producer of U.S. oil and the supplier
of eighty percent of the cocaine that enters this country.94 Through
assistance to the Colombian government, the United States has also
become, in effect, a contributor and facilitator of the violence and
devastation suffered by Colombian citizens. In response to U.S. aid in
2001, the situation in Colombia got worse-not better. Guerilla
groups launched attacks throughout the country, paramilitaries and
the army fought back, and violence and killings intensified. 95 Some of
those killings are the result of American-made weapons and Ameri-
can-funded militias.96 The United States thus has a political-and ar-
guably moral-interest in the Colombian conflict. Yet, Colombian
87 Luz Estella Nagle, U.S. Mutual Assistance to Colombia: Vague Promises and Dimin-
ishing Returns, 23 FoRDnHAM INT'L L.J. 1235, 1270 (2000).
88 Id.
89 Id. Only Israel and Egypt ranked higher. Id.
90 Military Construction Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-246, 114 Stat. 511
(2001).
91 U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, PROPOSED US AID PACKAGE TO COLOMBIA (2000), at
http://www.refugees.org/news/crisis/colombiaaid.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
92 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-115, 115 Stat. 2118 (2002).
93 COLOMBIA CERTIFICATION CONSULTATION, BRIEFING PAPER: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1 (2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/02/certification3.pdf.
94 146 CONG. REc. H1053-54 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2000).
95 See AMNESTY INT'L, Colombia, in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2001 (2001),
available at http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2001.nsf/webamrcountries/COLOMBIA?
OpenDocument.
96 SeeJeffrey Cohan, Student Still Seeks Answers in Bombing of His Village, PrrT. PosT-
GAZETTE, Nov. 25, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL 101484928.
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citizens fleeing those dangers and applying for asylum in the United
States are currently rejected in increasing numbers.
A. The Conflict: A Forty-Year Struggle
1. The Actors: Guerillas, Paramilitaries, and Government Forces
In 1957, the two traditional political parties in Colombia, the Lib-
erals and the Conservatives, created an arrangement by which all
other political groups were denied power or influence in the nation's
"democratic" system. 97 Opposition to this exclusionary agreement be-
tween Colombia's two main political parties fueled a new movement,
and guerilla groups rose to prominence in the 1960s. 98 The guerillas
initially fought for control of land-forcing civilians off their property
to strengthen rebel presence throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 99 To-
day, two large guerilla groups remain active: the Ej6rcito de Libera-
ci6n Nacional (ELN), or the National Liberation Army, and the
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), or the Revo-
lutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. 100 Both the FARC and the ELN
are Marxist organizations that continue to "seek to overthrow the gov-
ernment and establish socialism in Colombia."10 1
Frustrated by guerillas' threats to their land and insufficient gov-
ernment protection, a number of Colombian landowners formed
"self-defen [s] e" groups in the 1970s.10 2 The "best-known regional
paramilitary organization" is the Autodefensas Campesinas de C6r-
doba y Urabd (ACCU), or the Peasant Self-Defense for C6rdoba and
Urabd.a03 The ACCU, however, has strong ties to the notorious na-
tional paramilitary organization, Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
(AUC), or the United Colombian Self-Defense Organization.1 0 4 The
"stated objective" of the AUC is to "rid Colombia of the guerillas," and
97 U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 84.
98 Id.
99 See Liliana Obreg6n & Maria Stavropoulou, In Search of Hope: The Plight of Dis-
placed Colombians, in THE FORSAKEN PEOPLE: CASE STUDIES OF THE INTERNALLY DiS-
PLACED 399, 412 (Roberta Cohen & Francis M. Deng eds., 1998).
100 Id.
101 U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, Colombia, in WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 2003 COUNTRY
REPORT, at http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/amer-Carib/2003/colom-
bia.cfm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) [hereinafter 2003 COUNTRY REPORT].
102 U.N. ESCOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 11(d), addendum pt. 1, 22, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1995/50/Add.1 (1994).
103 Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, Inter-Am. C.H.R. ch. I, 1
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it has become the most dangerous of all Colombian organizations-
generating the majority of the killings and forced displacement
throughout the nation since 1995.105
For forty years now, a civil war between guerilla forces, paramili-
tary groups, and the national military and police has devastated Co-
lombia. 10 6 In recent years, the violence has only gotten worse. In the
year 2000:
[M]ore than 4,000 people were victims of political killings, over 300
"disappeared", and an estimated 300,000 people were internally dis-
placed. At least 1,500 people were kidnapped by armed opposition
groups and paramilitary organizations; mass kidnaps of civilians
continued. Torture-often involving mutilation-remained wide-
spread, particularly as a prelude to murder by paramilitary
groups.... [and] "[d]eath squad"-style killings continued in urban
areas.
10 7
Since 2000, the average number of victims per year has continued
to rise, and the traditionally rural violence has become increasingly
urban. 10 8 Colombia suffers the "world's highest number of politically
motivated killings and kidnappings,"'0 9 and "could now have the sec-
ond largest internally displaced population in the world, after Su-
dan."'1"0 At the start of 2003, it was estimated that nearly three million
people were displaced by political violence.II In 2002, an estimated
one thousand Colombians fled their homes' 1 2 and twenty people died
every day as a result of the political and social violence. 1 3 Fifteen of
105 2003 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 101.
106 NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: COLOMBIA
7 (2003).
107 AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 95.
108 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Colombia, in PRINCIPAL CONCERNS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH FOR THE 58TH SESSION OF THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2002), at
http://www.hrw.org/un/unchr58.htm.
109 Press Release, U.S. Comm. for Refugees, Colombia Violence Leaves 2.1 Million
Internally Displaced; For Many, Refuge is Elusive (June 19, 2001), available at http://
www.refugees.org/news/press-releases/2001/ColomO6l9Ol.cfm; see also Jacob H.
Fries, Refugees from Colombia Make Plea for United States Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2002,
at B5 ("There is a greater risk of being kidnapped in Colombia than in any other
country in the world.").
110 NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, supra note 106, at 8.
111 Id.; see also 2003 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 101 (estimating a similar
number).
112 NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, supra note 106, at 8; Colombia-Refugees NGO:
1,000 a Day Forced to Fee Homes in Colombia, EFE NEWS SERV., July 5, 2002, available at
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
113 Colombia-Refugees NGO, supra note 112.
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these twenty were "killed in their homes, work places or as they com-
mute[d] to and from work."
1 4
2. Political Violence
The displacement suffered by Colombian citizens is not just a by-
product of armed conflict. Rather, as in many modern conflicts
throughout the world, forced displacement is a "deliberate strategy of
war."115 Direct confrontation between armed groups is rare. 116 In-
stead, "parties to the conflict settle scores by attacking civilians sus-
pected of sympathizing with the 'other' side."' 17  "The chaos,
vulnerability, and terror inspired in the population are part of a modus
operandi."I 18 Armed groups use killings and death threats to dispose
of perceived enemies, to take over property, to influence judicial or
administrative proceedings, and to motivate civilians to leave the
country or the area." 19 Neither the paramilitaries nor the guerillas are
innocent of atrocities. In the words of AUC leader Carlos Castafio:
"The methods used by the self-defense forces ... were no less violent
and disgusting than those used by [the guerillas] .... We copied the
guerillas' methods and confronted them with the same tactics."'
120
Colombian civilians are singled out for persecution based on
their actions or inactions. The difference between life and death can
be as simple as living on the wrong piece of land. For instance, in
November of 1998, President Andr~s Pastrana gave the FARC a "Swit-
zerland-sized" demilitarized area of Colombia as part of his negotia-
114 Id.
115 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Colombia: Human Rights Developments, in WORLD REPORT
2001, at http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/americas/colombia.html (last visited Feb. 11,
2004).
116 WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, PROTRACTED RELIEF AND RECOVERY OPERA-
TION-COLOMBIA 6139.00: ASSISTANCE TO PERSONS DISPLACED BY VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA
5 (1999), available at http://www.wfp.org/country-brief/projects/613900.pdf.
117 NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, COLOMBIA UPDATE FROM THE GLOBAL IDP PRO-
JECT (2002), at http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/0/2B7AO8515C240D3885256
BDB00538014?OpenDocument.
118 Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, supra note 103, at ch. VI,
1 62.
119 See U.N. ESCOR, 58th Sess., Agenda Item 3, 144, 188, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
2002/17 (2002).
120 MAURICIO ARANGUREN MOLINA, MI CONFESION: CARLOS CASTANO REVELA SUS
SECRETOS [MY CONFESSION: CARLOS CASTANO REVEALS HIS SECRETS] 224 (2001) ("Los
mtodos utilizados por las Autodefensas ... no fueron menos violentos y despreci-
ables que los empleados por el EPL y las FARC .... Copiamos los mdtodos de la
guerilla y asi la enfrentamos.").
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tions for peace.12 ' After talks failed in January of 2002, however, the
government re-took the demilitarized zone. 122 Although the citizens
living in the zone were never asked whether they wanted to live in
FARC-controlled territory, they were "stigmatized as 'FARC collabora-
tors"' because they stayed. 123
Within weeks, paramilitaries flooded the area to "hunt down
'guerilla sympathizers.' 124 As in many other areas of the country
where paramilitaries, guerillas, and government forces fight for con-
trol, civilians are in a "lose-lose situation."1 25 If the civilians in the
area had attempted to leave when the FARC took control, they would
have been perceived as government sympathizers and subjected to
persecution by the guerillas. "The very fact of having fled typically
heightens suspicions of allegiance to a particular armed actor and in-
tensifies the risk of being targeted." 26 Yet, because they remained
silent and chose not to leave, they are persecuted as FARC sympathiz-
ers. "Whether [the civilians] remain or flee, their actions are inter-
preted [by one faction or another] as a political choice, for which they
sometimes pay with their lives." 127
B. The Numbers: Colombians Applying for Asylum in the United States
The increase in the number of Colombian nationals that have
filed applications for asylum in the United States in just the past few
years is a symptom of the severity of the recent escalation in violence
in Colombia. Between 1992 and 1999, the number of applications
filed by Colombians ranged from a high of 1343 in 1994, to a low of
371 in 1998.128 The rate of approval for those applications remained
121 Chronology of the Strained Colombia-FARC Peace Process, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE,Jan. 10,
2002, available at 2002 WL 2313250.
122 NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, supra note 106, at 8.
123 Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Colombia: Civilians Once More at Imminent Risk
(Jan. 11, 2002), available at http://www.amnesty.org.uk/deliver/document/13026.
124 Press Release, Catholic Agency for Overseas Development, Colombians Cut Off
from the World Face New Fears (Mar. 13, 2002), available at http://
www.cafod.org.uk/archive/latinamerica/colombia2002O3l2.shtml.
125 NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, supra note 106, at 8.
126 U.N. ESCOR, 58th Sess., Agenda Item 12(a), addendum pt. 3, 63, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2002/83/Add.3 (2002).
127 NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, supra note 106, at 9 (emphasis added).
128 Asylum Applications Filed with the INS by Colombian Nationals, 22 REFUGEE REP.,
Jan. 2001, at 16 [hereinafter Asylum Applications Filed 2001]. The total number of
applications filed in the years 1992 to 1999 are as follows: 1992: 584; 1993: 1303; 1994:
1343; 1995: 768; 1996: 396; 1997: 538; 1998: 371; 1999: 427. Id.
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largely in the teens, with highs of twenty-six percent in 1992 and
thirty-nine percent in 1999.129
In 2000, however, the number of applications increased to over
eight times the number received in 1999.130 While only 334 applica-
tions were filed in 1999,131 2728 applications were filed in the year
2000.132 Surprisingly, according to INS, an impressive sixty-five per-
cent of those Colombian applicants received asylum in 2000.133
If a trend toward a higher approval rate continued, it might be
argued that U.S. asylum law is adequate to protect those who flee Co-
lombia's increasingly devastating political conflict. This, however, has
not been the case. The number of Colombian asylum applications
has continued to rise dramatically, multiplying nearly two and a half
times from the year 2000 to 2001.134 The rate of approval for applica-
tions in 2001, however, decreased by nearly ten percent to a rate of
fifty-six percent. 135 In 2002, a record 7967 Colombians requested asy-
lum, but the approval rate dropped to a mere thirty-seven percent. 3 6
Although the objective number of applicants granted asylum has
gone up in recent years, the fact of the matter remains that the con-
flict in Colombia has only gotten worse.13 7 When violence, killings,
and persecution are on the rise in a country, logic dictates that the
percentage of asylum applicants-even if the pool is a large one-with
129 Id. The approval rates for years 1992 to 1999 are as follows: 1992: 26%; 1993:
11%; 1994: 13%; 1995: 14%; 1996: 17%; 1997: 12%; 1998: 19%; 1999: 39%. Id.
130 IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, 2000 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 102 (2002), available at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/Yearbook2000.pdf [hereinafter
2000 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK]; IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SER-
VICE 102 (2002), available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/
FY99Yearbook.pdf [hereinafter 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK].
131 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 130, at 102.
132 2000 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 130, at 102.
133 Id.
134 IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, 2001 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 104 (2002), available at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/Yearbook200l.pdf [hereinafter
2001 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK]; Alfonso Chardy, Strife in Colombia Increases Emigrants,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 5, 2002, at 1B, available at 2002 WL 16464906.
135 2001 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 134, at 104; Chardy, supra note 134.
136 2002 YEARBOOK, supra note 12, at 71. By comparison, applicant approvals from
other countries were as follows: Afghanistan: 63%; China: 52%; India: 48%; Iraq:
67%; Kuwait: 67%; Ethiopia: 68%; Sudan: 64%; Cuba: 64%. Id. at 69-71.
137 See Colombia-Refugees: Colombian Refugee Problem Worsening, EFE NEWS SERV.,
June 18, 2002, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File; Press Release, U.S.
Comm. for Refugees, Violence and Displacement on the Increase in Colombia
(2002), at http://www.refugees.org/news/press _releases/2002/040602.cfm.
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valid asylum claims would increase and not decrease. Yet, the U.S.
government continues to send increasing numbers of Colombian citi-
zens back to a situation that is more dangerous every day.
C. A Look at the Cases: Asylum Law Applied to Colombian Refugees
The current legal standards for exclusion are harsh and unforgiv-
ing for modern refugees given the realities of today's world. Colombi-
ans especially struggle to establish a valid asylum claim under the
requirement of "particularized persecution" set forth in Elias-Zacarias.
A look at several immigration cases reviewed by U.S. Courts of Appeals
gives us a glimpse of how the law has been applied to Colombians in
recent years.
1 3 8
1. Asylum for a Politician in 1999
In 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed
the BIA's reversal of an IJ's decision to grant asylum to Carlos
Eduardo Reyes-Guerrero and his wife, both of whom were Colombian
citizens. 139 Reyes-Guerrero v. INS was a standard political asylum case
that had little to do with the conflict between armed groups in Colom-
bia. Reyes-Guerrero was a member of the Conservative Party, one of
the two main political parties in Colombia.140 Involved in the investi-
gation and prosecution of a number of crimes, he was assigned to
investigate the "White Collar Scandal" in 1980 that led to the arrest
and conviction of eighteen members of the opposition party, the Lib-
eral Party.' 4 1 Reyes-Guerrero received death threats and bribes
throughout the investigation and prosecution, but the threats contin-
ued after the convictions. Even though he "changed vehicles, resi-
dences, offices, and phone numbers,' 42 the threats did not cease, and
138 Because asylum is discretionary, see supra note 78 and accompanying text, a
court of appeals "reviews determinations of the BIA under the highly deferential stan-
dard of substantial evidence." Acosta v. INS, No. 98-70299, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
34503, at *4 (9th Cir. Dec. 28, 1999) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting); see also Singh v.
INS, 134 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1998) ("We review the BIA's decision that Petitioner
has not established eligibility for asylum under the substantial evidence standard.").
The BIA's decision "must be affirmed unless the petitioner can establish 'that the
evidence she presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to
find [eligibility for asylum].'" Acosta, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 34503, at *4
(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84
(1992)).
139 Reyes-Guerrero v. INS, 192 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1999).
140 Id. at 1243.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 1244.
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he was warned that he would not "get away with the damage he caused
the Liberal Party.'
43
In its discussion of the case, the Ninth Circuit asserted that the
BIA erred in reducing the threats to "nothing more than attempts by
criminal defendants to disrupt the criminal process. 1 44 Interestingly,
the court noted that "[d] ue to insufficient police and judicial re-
sources to investigate and prosecute most killings and the frequently
overlapping violent forces at work, it is often difficult to differentiate
political from non-political murders." 145 The court also recalled that
it had previously held that "death threats by people on one side of a
civil war against a person suspected of being on the other side consti-
tute[ ] persecution on account of political opinion."' 46
Reyes-Guerrero, however, was not a civilian threatened by gueril-
las or paramilitaries. He was a politician-well-off in his native coun-
try and able to give the court what it wanted: (1) evidence that he had
a political opinion-politics was his job, after all; (2) evidence that his
persecutors knew of his political opinion because he was a public fig-
ure; and (3) evidence that he was singled out from the general popu-
lation because of his political actions. As for fear of future
persecution, the court quoted the U.S. State Department's Country
Profile for Colombia: "Magistrates, judges, attorneys, and prosecutors
have been suborned, threatened, assassinated, or had family members
killed in connection with certain cases."'147 Simply stated, Reyes-Guer-
rero was able to show "particularized persecution," and the Ninth Cir-
cuit decided that the evidence was strong enough to "compel" the
conclusion that that he and his wife were eligible for asylum.
2. Asylum for a Peasant in 1999
Later that same year, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case of
Acosta v. INS.148 Adalgiza Acosta and her ten year old daughter, na-
tives of Colombia, were denied asylum by both an IJ and the BIA.149
Unlike Reyes-Guerrero, the Acosta case did involve alleged persecution
by a guerilla group involved in the civil conflict raging throughout
Colombia. According to Acosta, she "belonged to a peasant group
specifically formed to thwart the guerillas," and as a result of her ac-
143 Id. at 1243-44.
144 Id. at 1245.
145 Id. (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1994 COUNTRY PROFILE FOR COLOMBIA).
146 Id. (quoting Gomez-Saballos v. INS, 79 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1996)).
147 Id. at 1246.
148 No. 98-70299, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 34503 (9th Cir. Dec. 28, 1999).
149 Id. at *2.
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tions, members of a guerilla organization repeatedly harassed her. 50
On one occasion, the guerillas kidnapped Acosta and several others
from the field where they were working, and two women were
raped. 51 Acosta reported that she complained to police regarding
the harassment, but later saw the police socializing with those same
guerillas.
152
The Ninth Circuit determined that "[a] reasonable factfinder
would have to infer that the guerillas imputed a political opinion to
Acosta because of her known organizational and accusatorial activity
and at least in part on that account treated her with extraordinary
brutality constituting persecution."'153 The Ninth Circuit decided
there was enough evidence to compel a reversal and remanded the
case to the BIA. 15
4
Judge O'Scannlain, however, disagreed with the majority's con-
clusion. In his dissent, O'Scannlain outlined a number of facts that
were not mentioned in the majority's short decision. "Although there
can be no doubt that Acosta suffered horribly at the hands of these
guerillas," he wrote, "there can also be no doubt that she did so simply
because she refused to grow marijuana and poppies for them."'155
Judge O'Scannlain indicated that the. peasant group "to which Acosta
belonged was not a political entity so much as a rural cooperative,"
and noted that the "record [did] not reveal any incidents of political
activity on the part of [her] group."'51 6 "The guerillas abducted every-
one in the field that day-oblivious to anyone's membership in the
peasant organization," he concluded, "[and t] hese men were indiffer-
ent to any political opinion Acosta or their other victims may have
held. Refusal to grow illegal drugs for guerillas is not an enumerated
ground on which to base asylum."'1 57
Judge O'Scannlain saw Acosta's situation as similar to that of
Elias-Zacarias. In his opinion, Acosta could not show that she had a
real political opinion, and mere refusal to do what the guerillas
wanted her to do did not constitute a political opinion. The majority,
on the other hand, took Acosta at her word-. She was able to provide
them with enough of what they wanted to see: (1) evidence that she
had a political opinion through membership in a political organiza-
150 Id. at *3.
151 Id. at *6 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at *3.
153 Id.
154 Id. at *2.
155 Id. at *6 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at *5 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
157 Id. at *6 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
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tion; (2) some likelihood that the guerillas knew of her membership
in this organization; and (3) a story of how her group was singled out
for persecution by the guerillas because of the mission of that organi-
zation. Acosta's case was weaker than the one presented in Reyes-Guer-
rero, but the court gave her the benefit of the doubt.
3. No Asylum for a Potential Recruit in 2001
Nearly two years later, in 2001, the Ninth Circuit considered the
case of Mondragon-Hernandez v. INS.158 Luis Mondragon-Hernandez, a
native of Colombia, petitioned the court for a review of the BIA's de-
nial of his asylum request. 159 According to Mondragon-Hernandez,
N-19 guerillas attempted to recruit him to fight with them, but he
refused.160 He received a threatening letter from the N-19, and he
fled, fearing reprisal. 161 To establish that he had a political opinion
and a reason to fear the N-19, Mondragon-Hernandez testified that he
did not like guerilla organizations and did not "agree with the N-19 as
a political group." 162 Mondragon-Hernandez also submitted evidence
that two of his brothers served in the national military-suggesting
that the N-19 would be even more likely to believe that he had politi-
cal opinions contrary to their organization.1
63
In the end, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Mondragon-Her-
nandez failed in his burden of proof because he could not show his
persecution was "particularized." The court determined that there
was no evidence "the N-19 was aware of an actual political opinion
held by Mondragon-Hernandez or that it targeted Mondragon-Her-
nandez on account of his political opinion."' 64 While just two years
prior, the court had been quite liberal in concluding that guerillas
knew of Acosta's political opinion when she refused to accede to their
demands, the Ninth Circuit read the facts much more narrowly in
Mondragon-Hernandez.
Although the political opinion in question for an asylum case is
the victim's political opinion, and not the persecutor's, 165 the court
wanted to see evidence that the guerillas in this situation acted the way
they did because they were aware of Mondragon-Hernandez's political
opinion. The court did not, as it did in Reyes-Guerrero, make note of
158 11 Fed. Appx. 911 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion).
159 Id. at 912.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 912-13.
162 Id. at 912.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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the fact that it is difficult to differentiate between political and
nonpolitical actions in Colombia today. 166 The court did not consider
that the moment a guerilla asks a civilian to join their ranks and the
civilian refuses, that person has made a choice not to support one
faction of a very complicated political civil conflict. The court did not
mention its previous holding that "death threats by people on one
side of a civil war against a person suspected of being on the other
side constitute[ ] persecution on account of political opinion.' 67 In-
stead, the court concluded that a threatening letter from the N-19 was
not sufficient evidence to show particularized persecution because the
guerillas did not explain why they were making their threat.168 Mon-
dragon-Hernandez, for this court, was just another Elias-Zacarias. He
could not show, to the court's satisfaction, that he (1) had a political
opinion; (2) that the guerillas knew of that opinion; or (3) that he was
singled out for persecution because of his opinion.
4. No Asylum for a Journalist in 2002
In March of 2002, the Ninth Circuit examined yet another peti-
tion for review of the BIA's decision to deny a Colombian asylum. In
Roman-Fernandez v. INS,169 Alvaro Roman-Fernandez claimed that he
feared persecution if he returned to Colombia because his ex-wife
"'worked for a political candidate' and as a result, each member of
the family had received death threats from the other side. '170 He also
asserted that he had worked as a "Radio DJ" and "TV talk show
host"-positions in which he had "spoken out against the Colombian
government and the drug cartels.
171
The court concluded, however, that Roman-Fernandez had not
met his burden of proof for asylum. The evidence, the court ex-
plained, was "too vague," and "consisted of general articles about Co-
lombia that have nothing in them specifically related to the Romans
themselves." 172 Because Roman-Fernandez was unable to show who
would persecute him and why they would know of his political beliefs,
he failed to establish a well-founded fear of "particularized persecu-
tion," and the court was unwilling to give him the benefit of the
doubt.
166 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
167 Gomez-Saballos v. INS, 79 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1996).
168 Mondragon-Hernandez, 11 Fed. Appx. at 913.
169 34 Fed. Appx. 553 (9th Cir. 2002) (unpublished opinion).
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D. Forcing the Asylum-Seeker into a Legal Mold
The courts' treatment of Colombian asylum-seekers exemplifies
the ways in which U.S. asylum law fails to recognize many current con-
flicts as political and is unable to acknowledge the realities of today's
world for the modern refugee. Requiring Colombians fleeing politi-
cal civil conflict to prove "particularized persecution," or (1) that they
were individually targeted for persecution based on their political
opinion, and (2) how and why they were targets for that persecution,
is a legal standard that many, no matter how genuine their claim, sim-
ply cannot meet. The violence that devastates Colombia is politically
motivated. The persecutors are political groups whose every action is
intended to strengthen their standing and agenda or harm the oppo-
sition. Yet, our courts say that the political opinions of the persecutor
are not relevant to an asylum adjudication, and a victim cannot prove
persecution unless the persecutor had some knowledge of the victim's
own political beliefs.1 73 Then, somehow the asylum-seeker has to have
real evidence for the immigration officer or judge that will convince
him or her that the persecutor acted on, and as a result of, that
knowledge.
U.S. asylum law fails to take into account that every action or inac-
tion by a Colombian civilian-or other similarly situated refugees
throughout the world-can lead to repercussions at the hands of one
or more armed groups as an action or inaction that has political
meaning.1 74 Daily life becomes politicized and "render[s] entire
populations politically suspect."1 75 Guerillas and paramilitaries iden-
tify those who support the "other side" through open or concealed
surveillance, and an "either/or mentality" leaves "no room for neu-
trality."' 76 Asylum officials want to know why a particular asylum-
seeker is at risk for persecution or suffered persecution, not why all
the members of that asylum-seeker's family or village are at risk-but
for many applicants, "these two issue [s are] inseparable."' 77
173 See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992).
174 See Coutin, supra note 35, at 75-76. Coutin quotes a Guatemalan woman who
suffered a similar war in her country:
Suppose that a guerrilla member asks you for a glass of water. You give it to
him, because you don't know what type of person he is. And suppose that
another person sees you, then [that person] can denounce you .... One
doesn't know from night to day if one is going to survive.
Id.
175 Id. at 74.
176 See id. at 75.
177 Id. at 86.
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The law also fails to take into account that, given the complexity
of the situation in their native land, modern refugees themselves may
not know the identity of their persecutors. Often, threats and vio-
lence are attributed to a "mysterious 'they."'1 78 One Colombian wo-
man recounted the circumstances surrounding the death of her
husband, who was shot dead by four men as the couple took a walk
together: "They told me he was killed because he was an informant...
I don't know if they were paramilitaries or rebels. I just buried my
husband and left the next day because I didn't want to wait for them
to come back."'
179
Even if one can identify his persecutors, however, oppressors
rarely stop to ask their victims about their political beliefs or opinions.
Proving knowledge or the intent of the persecutor can be next to im-
possible for many Colombian asylum-seekers and other similarly situ-
ated refugees. As one family in El Salvador, a country brutalized by
similar violence for twelve years beginning in the 1980s, described:
"[P]eople who do these things don't go around verifying who's in-
volved in what.' 8 0 The showing of "particularized persecution," re-
quired by the Supreme Court in Elias-Zacarias, is an unrealistic
requirement for many of those fleeing political violence in the world
today.
E. Other Factors that Play a Role in the Denial of Asylum Status
In addition to the application of harsh and unforgiving legal stan-
dards that fail to adequately address current conflicts involving politi-
cal violence, modern asylum-seekers also face underlying assumptions
and beliefs on the part of asylum administrators caused by the "con-
temporary realities"181 of refugee flight in today's world. The discre-
tionary system currently in place allows these factors to strongly
influence, if not determine, the denial of an applicant-even if she is
able to establish a valid asylum claim under the law.182
178 See id. at 77.
179 Sandra Hernandez, Poor Town Hit Hard by Colombian Crisis, SUN-SENTINEL, Dec.
26, 2001, at 29A, available at 2001 WL 29963532.
180 Coutin, supra note 35, at 77.
181 Editorial, Seeking Protection's 'Holy Grail, 'REFUGEES, No. 132, 2003, at 2, 2, avail-
able at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf.tbl=MEDIA&id=
3f68317d4&page=publ.
182 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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Today, the world is plagued with "messier, internal crises," 183 but
because of "improved communications [,] the world, almost overnight,
has grown smaller."1 84 More and more refugees are finding ways to
leave the persecution in their homelands and find a way to the United
States. Government officials, however, regard large influxes of refu-
gees with suspicion.
185
When the number of asylum applications from Colombians ex-
ploded in the year 2000, U.S. government officials realized that many
Colombians were applying for asylum after arriving in U.S. airports
while in transit to another country. 186 In order to deter Colombian
asylum-seekers from entering the United States, beginning April 2,
2001, Colombians with a layover in the United States while on their
way to a third country were required to present U.S. visas before
boarding any U.S.-bound flight.1 87 Applicants for these visas were
forced to wait fourteen months for an appointment with the U.S. Con-
sulate in BogotA. 188
Immigration officers may simply deny Colombian applicants asy-
lum because they believe the United States cannot or should not take
responsibility for so many people. Although approvals for Colombi-
ans increased in the year 2000, the sudden influx of applications in
2001 may have scared many officials in the system into enforcing more
strictly an already harsh burden of proof for Colombian applicants.
In a discretionary system, immigration officials and judges also begin
to compare claims when there are increasing numbers of applicants
from the same country.189 A deserving asylum petition may be turned
down simply because it is not as dire as the Colombian case the IJ
183 Ray Wilkinson, Old Problems... New Realities, REFUGEES, No. 132, 2003, at 6, 9,
available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdftbl=MEDIA
&id=3f68317d4&page=publ.
184 Id. at 6.
185 See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 41, at 155.
186 New Visa Requirement for Colombians Transiting the United States, M2 PEssWIRE,
Apr. 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL 17451943.
187 Prior to April 2, 2001, Colombians could stay in the United States for a short
time without a visa while they were en route to their country of destination. Id.;James
Wilson, Europe & Latin America: Closed Doors Replace Welcome Mat for Colombians, FIN.
TIMES (London), Apr. 10, 2001, at 3, available at LEXIS, News & Business Library, All
News File. European countries joined with the United States in imposing these re-
strictions. See Maria Isabel Garcia, Population: U.S., Europe Restrict Entry by Colombians,
INTER PRESS SERV., Apr. 3, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4803347.
188 Chardy, supra note 134.
189 See WELL-FOUNDED FEAR, supra note 79 (quoting asylum officers discussing the
difficulty of assessing asylum claims when they hear more and more people from the
same country telling the same story of persecution).
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heard the day or week before, or because another applicant was able
to give the officer a more detailed story. '9 0 Many immigration officials
also take a mental tally of the cases they have granted, and although
asylum-seekers are not subject to statutory numerical limitations, 191
the officers may nevertheless find that a number of applicants fall
outside their internally regulated "quota."'
192
Large influxes of refugees also arouse suspicion that most asylum-
seekers are "simply seeking a better life elsewhere."' 93 The conflict in
Colombia has had a devastating effect on both the landscape of the
country and its citizens. From 1999 to 2002, "urban poverty grew from
55 to 59 percent, while in rural areas it rose 1 point in that period to
80 percent. ' 19 4 Some Colombians do indeed seek to escape the eco-
nomic crisis caused by war,195 but economic harm alone is not one of
the five grounds of persecution outlined in INA § 101 (a) (42). If an
immigration officer or judge believes that an asylum-seeker came to
the United States not for fear of any particular political group or indi-
viduals, but because she feared losing her possessions or not being
able to feed her family, that asylum-seeker will be summarily de-
nied. 19 6 Yet, when genuine persecution forces a refugee to flee her
country because she has lost all of her possessions and cannot feed
her family, the ability to distinguish a valid asylum claim from an eco-
nomic one is blurred.
19 7
III. OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
The United States cannot accommodate everyone that faces dan-
ger in his or her native country. Yet, if the U.S. government touts
itself as a compassionate superpower, advocate of human liberty,
198
and a staunch supporter of human rights, 199 action should be taken in
190 See id.
191 See supra note 73.
192 See WELL-FOUNDED FAR, supra note 79 (quoting an asylum officer who states
that "[y]our chances of getting a[n asylum] grant depend on who you get as much as
what your claim is-simply because, you know, everybody has got their own
threshold . . .").
193 Wilkinson, supra note 183, at 8.
194 Yadira Ferrer, Colombia: Poverty Deepens, with Peace Still Distant, INTER PRESS
SERV., Jan. 15, 2003, available at 2002 WL 6913807.
195 See Wilson, supra note 187.
196 See WELL-FOUNDED FEAR, supra note 79 ("A lot of people would like to come
here to better their lives, but it's not grounds for asylum.").
197 See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 41, at 280.
198 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
199 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY. THE U.S.
REcoRD 2002-2003 (2003), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/shrd/2002/.
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order to protect genuine refugees who have fled political conflicts and
are already present on U.S. soil. The United States agreed to terms
mandating that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return
('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened"200 on ac-
count of protected characteristics when it ratified the U.N. Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1967. Currently, the United
States is not meeting that obligation.
20 1
A. Temporary Protected Status: The "Quick Fix"?
"Temporary Protected Status" (TPS) is one way in which current
U.S. law may be used to protect the lives of modem refugees already
present in the United States and facing genuine danger if they were to
return to their home country. TPS was first created in 1990 to "pro-
vide temporary protection to people who lacked legal status in the
United States [and] who, if returned to their home countries, would
face 'a serious threat to their personal safety."' 202 The U.S. Attorney
General, under INA § 244(b) (1), may designate a country or region
for TPS, after consulting "appropriate" government agencies, under
one of three conditions: (1) ongoing war or armed conflict poses a
serious threat to citizens returning to their country; (2) a country can-
not accommodate the return of its citizens because of an earthquake,
flood, drought, or other environmental disaster; or (3) citizens cannot
safely return to their country because of "extraordinary and tempo-
rary conditions" and U.S. national interests are not compromised by
allowing them to stay.203 The Attorney General designates the time
period during which TPS is in force-a period between six and eigh-
teen months, 20 4 and INA § 244(b) (3) provides for periodic review of
country conditions and allows the Attorney General to extend the
original time period if necessary. 20 5
For modern refugees in the United States who seek asylum but
are denied status by immigration officials and judges because they
200 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33, 19 U.S.T.
6259, 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 176.
201 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
202 TPS for Colombians Gaining Support, in WORLDWIDE REFUGEE INFORMATION (U.S.
Comm. for Refugees ed., 2002), available at http://www.refugees.org/world/articles/
tps-rrOl7.htm.
203 INA § 244 (b) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (2000). Recent countries that have been
designated for TPS are Liberia, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon, and Ku-
wait. MUSALO ET AL., supra note 16, at 930.
204 INA § 244(b) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a).
205 INA § 244(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a).
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cannot show particularized persecution, TPS is a dream come true.
TPS allows specifically enumerated asylum-seekers from specified na-
tions or regions to remain in the United States during the period of
protection and obtain employment authorization. 20 6 This would be a
blessing for many of today's refugees who have been denied asylum
status but remain in the United States, eluding removal-as well as for
those who have been afraid to apply for asylum, terrified that their
claim would be denied.207 TPS serves as a net to catch those who have
fallen through the cracks of the failures of our asylum law.
Currently, Colombians are being considered for TPS protection.
In recent years, a number of advocates, horrified by the situations Co-
lombian refugees faced in their native country, lobbied for TPS for
Colombians residing in the United States. 208 The Colombian govern-
ment also joined in this request,20 9 along with the U.N. refugee
agency 210 and several members of Congress. 211 On May 5, 2003, Sena-
tor Harry Reid introduced the Colombian Temporary Protected Sta-
206 INA § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a).
207 See TPS for Colombians Gaining Support, supra note 202 ("[T]he majority of
Colombians in the United States do not apply for asylum fearing that if they are una-
ble to prove their asylum claims they will be deported.").
208 See, e.g., Jacob H. Fries, Refugees from Colombia Make Plea for United States Asylum,
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2002, at B5; Ralph R. Ortega, Colombians Seeking Shelter: Refugees
from War Zones Appeal for Protection, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Sept. 11, 2001, at 2, available at
2001 WL 23592660; Miguel Perez, Colombians Rally in N.J. for Special U.S. Protection,
RECORD, June 22, 2002, at A13, available at 2002 WL 4662667 ("For more than two
years, Colombians have been actively seeking 18-month temporary legal stays granted
to foreign nationals who have been forced to flee their countries due to armed con-
flicts, war, or natural disasters."); Timothy Pratt, Colombians Search for Safe Haven, LAS
VEGAS SUN, Apr. 5, 2003, at 14, available at 2003 WL 7820126; Yolanda Rodriguez,
Colombians: Strife at Home Should Merit Special Status, ATLANTAJ.-CONST., Jan. 8, 2003, at
F2, available at 2003 WL 8962132; TPS for Colombians Gaining Support, supra note 202
("[M]ore than 100 U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including
faith-based groups, human rights organizations, humanitarian and relief groups, and
Colombian-American organizations, wrote to all members of Congress encouraging
them to support [temporary protected status for Colombians]."); Jos6 Miguel
Vivanco, U.S. Should Grant Special Status to Undocumented Colombians: Letter to Attorney
General John Ashcrofl, HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS, Dec. 23, 2002, available at http://
www.hrw.org/press/2002/12/colombial2231tr.htm.
209 Wilson, supra note 187 ("Bogota has asked the US to provide temporary relief
from deportation for the hundreds of thousands of illegally resident Colombians,
fearing that mass repatriation could exacerbate the country's acute problems.").
210 Refugee Agency Urges US to Protect Colombian Refugees, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Nov. 15,
2002, available at 2002 WL 23650286.
211 TPS for Colombians Gaining Support, supra note 202.
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tus Act of 2003 on the Senate floor.2 12 Citing a "particularly pressing
yet overlooked crisis . . . taking place right here in this hemisphere,"
Senator Reid proposed TPS as a "purely humanitarian act that enjoys
plenty of precedent."2 13 His fellow Democrat, Representative James
McGovern, introduced TPS for Colombians in the House on July 24,
2003.214
Yet, TPS is a temporary solution. It is a "short-term strategy to se-
cure the immediate physical safety of refugees." 215 If TPS becomes a
reality for Colombians in the United States, it will protect only those
who are "continuously physically present" in the United States from
the time Colombia is designated for TPS status to the time the benefi-
ciary submits his or her application. 216 The Colombian Temporary
Protected Status Act of 2003, as proposed by Senator Reid, designates
a time period of one year.2 17 Even assuming that extensions are
made, the dangers of a forty-year war are unlikely to fade in the near
future. TPS will not protect family members Colombian refugees have
left behind, and it will not protect those who arrive after the day on
which TPS becomes a reality. In just two to three years, the United
States will face yet another situation in which large numbers of Colom-
bians are, in the words of Senator Reid himself, "forcibly de-
port[ed] .. .placing them in danger of being tortured, kidnap [p]ed,
or even murdered upon their return to their war-torn homeland."
21 8
TPS is also a slow moving and highly politicized solution. It is, in
effect, a reversion to the days when Congress officially defined refu-
gees entitled to asylum protection by nationality or geographic loca-
tion. TPS may be regarded as the ideal "quick fix" for Colombians
currently in the United States that fear removal, but in the hands of
politicians, making TPS a reality for those in need has been anything
but "quick." Although the war in Colombia has ravaged the country
for decades, and the violence and dangers have increased in recent
212 S. 986, 108th Cong. (2003); 149 CONG. REc. S5730-31 (daily ed. May 5, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Reid); see also Recently Introduced Legislation: Senate Legislation, WASH.
UPDATE (Am. Immigration Lawyers Assoc.), AILA Doc. No. 03051940, May 19, 2003,
at 8, available at http://www.aila.org.
213 149 CONG. REc. 5730, 5731 (daily ed. May 5, 2003) (statement of Sen. Reid).
214 H.R. 2853, 108th Cong. (2003); see also Recently Introduced Legislation: House Leg-
islation, WASH. UPDATE (Amer. Immigration Lawyers Assoc.), AILA Doc. No.
03081113, Aug. 11, 2003, at 13, available at http://www.aila.org.
215 Joan Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized Regime,
94 AM. J. INT'L L. 279, 280 (2000).
216 See 149 CONG. REc. S5730, 5731 (daily ed. 2003) (statement of Sen. Reid)
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years, no Attorney General designated Colombia for TPS status, and
no member of Congress introduced a bill for that purpose until Au-
gust 1, 2002.219 In the hands of politicians and policymakers, any TPS
future for Colombians will depend upon whether U.S. legislators
think that this status will have adverse effects on American laborers,
open the border to refugees fleeing economic hardship instead of
physical danger, or make the United States a "magnet" for floods of
refugees that would cause difficulties for national security.220 And,
the same procedure will have to be followed with every group of mod-
ern refugees who face similar conflicts in their homelands. While
Congress debates these issues year after year, more and more asylum-
seekers will be sent back to the dangers of current conflicts in their
native lands.
B. Recognizing a New World: A New Definition of "Refugee"
TPS relieves refugees from having to meet the stringent standards
imposed by immigration officials and judges, but on a more funda-
mental level, TPS merely "relieve[s] the state from granting asy-
lum."221 The United States adopted a definition of "refugee" similar
to that of the United Nations in 1980 in order to "harmonize U.S. law
with its international obligations," 222 but it has applied this definition
blindly. When international law has moved "beyond the confines of
the definition of a refugee found in . . .[the] 1967 Protocol, Ameri-
can legal scholarship often [remains] wedded to that definition. '" 223
Immigration officials and judges have ignored the realities of present
conflicts and have exhibited an unwillingness or inability to adapt our
law to these conditions. The definition created in the 1960s and
adopted by the United States for the world of 1980 is not protecting
those who flee from today's political violence-including Colombians.
As early as 1969-just two years after the U.N. Protocol of 1967-
African nations realized that the definition adopted by the 1967 Pro-
tocol would not be adequate to protect their citizens. In an effort to
219 S. 2856, 107th Cong. (2002).
220 All of these issues were considered by Congress in 1989 while legislators de-
bated whether or not to create TPS status. See Ari Weitzhandler, Temporary Protected
Status: The Congressional Response to the Plight of Salvardoran Aliens, 64 U. CoLo. L. REv.
249, 262 (1993).
221 MusALO ET AL., supra note 16, at 929.
222 Id. at 66 (citing Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A
Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 9, 9 (1981)).
223 James A.R. Nafziger, A Commentary on American Legal Scholarship Concerning the
Admission of Migrants, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 165, 174 (1984).
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"'Africanize' the then existing international definition of refugee," 224
the Organization of African Unity (OAU), a political umbrella organi-
zation, broadened its definition. The new definition of "refugee" in-
cluded "every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation,
foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in ei-
ther part o [r] the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is com-
pelled to leave his [or her] place of habitual residence in order to
seek refuge .... -225 Thirty-five African countries have ratified this
definition in the Convention on Refugee Problems in Africa. 226 The
OAU's intent to create a regional definition "ultimately predicted the
course of the world's refugee problems."
227
The OAU definition incorporates several modifications of the in-
ternational and U.S. definition of "refugee" that acknowledge the cir-
cumstances surrounding modern conflicts throughout the world.
First, the new definition explicitly recognizes that a government's loss
of authority and inability to control groups within its borders creates a
situation for human rights abuses that are "no less wrong" than if the
harm was inflicted "by the government of that state per se."228 The
OAU definition also legitimizes flight from generalized political vio-
lence and extends protection to those who seek to escape serious dis-
ruptions of the public order in only part of the country-recognizing
the reality that while a citizen may flee to a "safer" part of the country,
that "'safe' region today may be dangerous tomorrow."229 Perhaps
most importantly for Colombians and other similarly situated refu-
gees, the OAU definition allows for the "possibility that the basis or
rationale for [the persecution suffered] may be indeterminate."23 0 The
definition focuses on the "compulsion" of the refugee to leave his or
her place of residence and seek shelter, and not on the motivations of
those who cause that individual to flee-which can be nearly impossi-
ble for an asylum-seeker to prove.
The OAU is not the only organization to develop a more modern
definition of refugee. In 1984, ten Latin American countries banded
together in the Cartagena Declaration to fashion a new definition of
refugee that would address the increased violence throughout Central
224 Isabelle R. Gunning, Expanding the International Definition of Refugee: A Multicul-
tural View, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 35, 47 (1989).
225 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, art. 1, 2, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, 47.
226 Gunning, supra note 224, at 46-47.
227 Id. at 48.
228 JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 17 (1991).
229 Id. at 19.
230 Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
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and South America. 231 Adopted by the 1985 General Assembly of the
Organization of American States (OAS), this new regional definition
is similar to the OAU definition. It bestows additional protection to
"persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety, or
freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign ag-
gression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or
other circumstances which have seriously disturbed the public or-
der."232 The OAS definition goes beyond the OAU definition to in-
clude those who seek to escape "massive violations of human rights,"
but it retains the old requirement that applicants must prove they
have been threatened.233 This proof requirement allows the govern-
ment to consider the dangers of social and political turmoil while lim-
iting protection to those who can "show that there is some real risk of
harm to persons similarly situated to the refugee claimant."234 The
proof requirement, however, does not require that the refugee show
individual particularized persecution.
Both the OAU and OAS definitions offer alternatives that take
into account the current conditions that are forcing many refugees
throughout the world-and Colombia-to flee their homes for shel-
ter in a distant land. Instead of focusing on the identity and motives
of the persecutor, these definitions place greater emphasis on the ex-
perience of the persecuted. A new definition for "refugee" would be a
bold move for the United States, but it is a move that is necessary
when the current law fails to recognize and adapt to changing interna-
tional conditions.
CONCLUSION
American asylum law is ill suited to protect those who flee today's
world conflicts. Asylum-seekers in the United States not only find
themselves at the whim of a politically motivated and discretionary
system that allows an officer or judge to reject even the most deserving
refugee, but they also face strict legal standards that force an applicant
to fit unrealistic requirements given the characteristics of modern vio-
lence. U.S. asylum law demands that an asylum-seeker prove why she
has been individually singled out for persecution on account of her
231 Colloquium on the Int'l Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico,
and Panama, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, in 20FFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM'R
FOR REFUGEES, COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND OTHER LEGAL TEXTS
CONCERNING REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS 206, 208 (1995).
232 Id. at 208.
233 See HATHAWAY, supra note 228, at 50.
234 Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
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political opinion. The law fails to recognize, however, that the actions
or inactions of a civilian caught in the midst of generalized political
violence can be construed as having a political significance for which
there are very real-and sometimes deadly-consequences. The ex-
perience of Colombian asylum-seekers in the United States demon-
strates that the current system of law is, in fact, flawed.
While TPS would provide welcome relief for many refugees in the
United States who cannot meet the standards for asylum but genu-
inely fear for their lives if they are forced to return to their home
countries, it is a highly political and protracted process whose effects
are only temporary. In order to implement an effective and enduring
asylum procedure that adequately addresses the realities of today's
world, a new definition for "refugee" should be considered and imple-
mented. The OAU and OAS definitions for "refugee" both offer alter-
natives that properly place their focus on the experience and genuine
fear of the asylum-seeker-and place less emphasis on the identity
and motives of the persecutor. The Refugee Act of 1980 was hailed as
"one of the most important pieces of humanitarian legislation ever
enacted by a United States Congress," 235 but narrowly defined na-
tional interests and harsh outdated standards have produced a cur-
rent system of law that fails to live up to that name. Only a decision by
Congress to implement a new definition of "refugee" that recognizes
the realities of modern world conflicts will suffice to protect today's
genuine asylum-seekers. That truly would be "humanitarian."
235 126 CONG. REc. 1523 (1980).
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